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Hallucinations and delusions, in keeping with the distress accompanying them, are
major features in the diagnosis of psychosis in international classifications. In spite of
their human and clinical importance, the concepts are unclear. The distinction between
hallucinations and delusions in terms of perception-thought is not precise enough,
causing problems in analyzing the patient’s words. Nor are the differentiations or
variations within each precise enough. Continuing the long clinical tradition discussing
the distinction between hallucinations and delusions while assuming their similarities,
this study poses a concept integrating the two phenomena as attributions people make
about themselves and their settings. Then the elements of any attribution can be used
as guides for structuring significant literature on both, and reduce analytical ambiguity.
Such attributions make more sense within the structure of two-way relationships with
factors in a person’s own framework and setting. This structure is described with its
variables and relationships as a guide to assessment, follow-up, and intervention. Two
checklists are provided for orientation.
Keywords: delusions, hallucinations, attributions, field model, psychosis
INTRODUCTION
Hallucinations and delusions are manifestations that cause those who experience them enormous
suffering (Varese et al., 2016; Garety et al., 2020). They are major factors in the diagnosis of psychotic
disorders in the most widely used classifications (American Psychiatric Association [APA], 2013;
World Health Organization [WHO], 2018). Hallucinations are Esquirol’s classical “perception
without object” (1817), and delusions are basically thoughts which do not fit reality (Jaspers, 1913).
In spite of their human and clinical significance, the concepts are problematic. The definitions in
the literature are themselves unclear (Garety et al., 2020) and varied (Sheaves et al., 2020) leading to
oversimplification. For example, a patient says he hears the voice of God. Although the reference to
what he hears seems clear, it is not so clear why he says it is the voice of God, or what about that voice
makes him identify it as such. Their distinction in terms of perception-thought is imprecise, making
analysis of the patient’s words hard to examine. As discussed further below, it is often not clear if
they really hear or see what they say they hear or see, or for example, as one woman said, “They talk
and talk, but not like you or me. It’s different.” In this sense, many hallucinatory phenomena, such
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as orders and comments, can be considered intrusive thoughts
(McCarthy-Jones et al., 2014), and the intrusive thoughts of
patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder may have audible
or visible characteristics (Moritz et al., 2018). Voices have both
sound and thought (Woods et al., 2015), and hallucinations may
have sensory elements related to thought (Jones and Luhrmann,
2016). For example, one patient we assessed said, “I realize I think
those things. . ., but no, I don’t, it’s the voices that are telling
me that, and they are very unpleasant.” This example includes
another problem, because what this person at first identified as
a thought, he later denies, or confuses with the hallucinations he
experiences. Furthermore, around 10% of auditory hallucinations
are inaudible (Moritz and Larøi, 2008), and some patients explain
their hallucinations as voices heard with the mind more than with
their ears (Henriksen et al., 2016).
Differentiations made within each phenomenon are also
imprecise. Although some hallucinations may be identified as
auditory, tactile, or visual, others are not described, such as
“The speaker on TV is talking to me in a special way,” “I
don’t know if I saw it or not, but it was there,” “A lot of
people are saying bad things about me, that I should kill myself
and that, but I don’t understand what they are saying, they
don’t say it in words.” This may suggest that such sensory
types are culturally molded expressions (Laroi et al., 2014).
Delusions, in the phenomenological tradition, are separated
into primary, that is unintelligible, or true delusions, and
secondary delusions, those understandable as life experiences
(like pathological jealousy or most of the persecutory delusions)
(World Health Organization [WHO], 2018). Nevertheless, this
distinction of secondary delusions as the patient’s effort at
interpretation (Maher, 2006) is unnecessary, because of the
difficulty in explaining an experience with no clear empirical
referent in primary delusions (Cermolacce et al., 2010). For
example, “I feel like I’m rotting,” “I feel like I don’t have a
soul anymore,” or “I don’t have a body.” And, however, in this
same line of research, the importance of the experiential or live
nature of the delusion is emphasized (Feyaerts et al., 2021).
That problem appears again in differentiating between autistic
delusions, considered metaphors of the subjective experience,
and therefore, similar to primary delusions, and empirical
delusions (Parnas et al., 2010), which have a realistic referent.
Other studies have relativized both the distinction between the
two phenomena, and within them (Dudley et al., 2018; Maijer
et al., 2018).
Continuing the discussion of the problems already mentioned
above, a long clinical tradition argues for the hallucination-
delusion distinction. Séglas (1982) referred to hallucinations as
thoughts audible only to the person himself. Building on the
works of Jaspers (1913), hallucinations have been described
as objectification of inner speech, spatialization of experience,
or perception of consciousness (Sass and Parnas, 2003), as a
cognitive phenomenon (Handest et al., 2016) not exclusively
perceptive-sensory. This is the case of a patient who said she
recognized her husband’s mistress, was completely convinced
that she had finally found out who she was, and that she had
seen her, and at the same time, mentioned that it was raining
at the time and she could not see her face because of the
umbrella, and all the while insisted she did not know who the
woman was. Another patient was not sure if he knew or saw
two policemen in a helicopter, saying they were smiling because
they were going to trap him (while he was on a bus). The
doubts about what patients hear are found in Bleuler (1960),
and in Clérambault (1926) who described mental automatism
as beginning without sensory reference. So, the problem in
distinguishing between thought and perception may come from
analyzing and later elaborating on cognitive phenomena. This
again makes perception-thought an oversimplified and imprecise
distinction. Alternatively, hallucinations and delusions have been
considered on a continuum (Strauss, 2014) between two extremes
related to the attenuated sense of self (Rosen et al., 2016), or
similar processes (Bentall, 1990), as a single dimension distorting
reality (Barch et al., 2013) and extensive to any positive symptom
(Moritz et al., 2017). The first objective of this study was therefore
to contribute a concept with parameters that can integrate
the findings recognized in the literature as hallucinations and
delusions, enabling both to be understood as different cases of
that single concept.
Nevertheless, some models have emphasized factors that are
significant in the disorders discussed here. Some are about the
person. Cognitive models have underlined the importance that
unfulfilled basic human needs, such as affiliation, security, or
care have on altered functioning (Gilbert, 2001; Campbell and
Morrison, 2012), development of one’s own schemas (about
the self, the world around us, and the future) (Beck et al.,
2019), avoidance or escape behaviors, or interpretations of the
symptoms themselves (Birchwood et al., 2000; Tully et al., 2017).
Family therapy models suggest that deficient communication,
coping, and self-control are important to symptoms (Palazzoli
et al., 1977; Liotti and Gumley, 2009). Other factors refer
to the setting. Finnish intervention in psychosis suggests the
importance of conditions favoring recovery, such as care and
its immediacy, dialogue, trust, and tolerance to uncertainty by
the patient’s support networks (Seikkula et al., 2006; Lakeman,
2014), and lack of family warmth as the best predictor of
relapse (Bucci et al., 2016). Other models emphasize factors
related to highly stressful situations, such as mourning or abuse
(Varese et al., 2012) or chronic stress, social isolation, and social
inequality (Read et al., 2013; Bentall et al., 2014). Such factors
alter the patient’s emotional state and thoughts about their self-
worth (Garety and Freeman, 2013), leading to hallucinations and
delusions in response to chronic, highly intense stress (Geekie
et al., 2012; Pienkos et al., 2019). Current phenomenological
perspectives also consider factors related to personal experience,
such as loss of familiarity and continuity in inner experiences
linked to identity. This affects loss of automatic cognitive, motor,
and emotional processes, involving loss of agency, experience
of vitality, integration, and sense of belonging (Henriksen and
Parnas, 2017). Loss of continuity or speed of thought favors
voicing of thought, personification, or spatialization of inner
speech (Parnas and Zandersen, 2018). Given the significance
of these factors in hallucinations and delusions, they should
be considered in the integrating concept sought. Thus, the
second objective of this study was to construct a model that
could achieve this.
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FIGURE 1 | Structure of the components of any attribution.
Moreover, both concept and model had to be delimited
precisely and clearly differentiated from each other, assembling
the aspects of the phenomena under study and the factors
mentioned in the literature discussed above.
Integrating Concept Proposed
This study integrates hallucinations and delusions by classifying
them both as attributions people make about their settings and
themselves. Then, the elements of any attribution may be used as
guides for analyzing significant literature on both, and reduce the
current ambiguity.
Attribution is therefore defined here as a person’s
interpretation of content or meaning assigned to someone
or something, and involves the following elements: Reference,
the content or meaning assigned; referral, the person or thing the
content of the reference is assigned to, and referent, the agent or
generator of the reference. Thus, the reference is the product of
the referent with mediation of the referral (see Figure 1). This
analysis was developed based on the hypotheses of Wilkinson
and Bell (2016) on agency in hallucinations and delusions.
Each attribution element includes several parameters with
different cases or possibilities, as summarized in Table 1. Location
is a parameter for both the referent and the referral. The referent
may be the person who makes the attribution, as in “I am
dead,” but could also be someone else, or something that makes
the attribution, as in “God hates me” or “Those antennas are
watching me.” The same is true of the referral, as in “They’re
watching me” or “They’re watching my father,” respectively, and
those others could be located within the person, as in “I have
another person moving inside my body.” There are two groups
of reference parameters. The first is the content of the attribution
and includes two parameters. One is the theme, with possibilities
mentioned in the literature: paranoid, passionate, somatic, etc.
Another parameter is the purpose identifiable in the content.
These could be advice, compliments, and so forth, grouped in
three types: Imposition (e.g., “It was when I looked him in the
eye that I knew he was going to kill me”), suggestion (e.g., “I was
really annoyed because they said I should buy a lottery ticket, but I
didn’t want to, because I don’t have any money.”), or neutral (e.g.,
“I don’t care, I don’t pay any attention to them,” when the voices
say they are going to kill him). The second group of parameters,
composition, includes structure and modality. Structure may be
relational if the attribution consists of some reasoning which
connects ideas, and non-relational if it consists of a mere cluster
of ideas. Examples of each are, “They want to kill me because I
am a spy” and “I am a spy, the Pope, and I like to eat with my
fingers.” In modality, the possibilities consist of expressing the
attribution reference as a thought or as sensory perception, as
in delusions and hallucinations, respectively, or a combination
of the two, as well as the ambiguity mentioned in the literature.
An example of the combination of attributions, with or without
sensory reference, would be one of the more common clinical
expressions. For instance, a patient who says he has been worried
for a long time because he has stopped helping his father in his
bar, and that his father had gotten so angry that he was harassing
him (which is not what his family says); that he started to hear the
neighbors criticizing him, and later, how he clearly sees how he is
shot in the head, from which he deduces that Basque terrorists are
behind all his father’s insistence.
Two last groups of parameters refer to the attribution as a
whole. One is the oral, written, and body language used to express
it. The other is the quality of its meaning and expression. Its
parameters include the criteria of scientific validity (Martínez
and Moreno, 2014). The first is precision or clarity. Some
attributions are imprecise in meaning, but precise in how they
are expressed, usually known as formal alterations of thought,
but with understandable words and syntax, such as “Turning
backward first is intelligent and keeps another crazy person with
criminal instincts from eating”; “How is it my fault that I have
six senses and I was born with a heart and you were not? The
drunkard understands me, I am crazy, I am the Supreme Judge, I,
Honoris Rex.” However, attributions that could be called a “word
salad” would be imprecise in both their meaning and how they are
expressed. The second quality parameter is differentiation, what
makes each attribution different from others, as one patient says:
“I really thought I was going to get married when the bells rang,
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Parameters Cases or possibilities
Referent Location The agent or generator of the
reference
A person or object other than the
person who attributes
Another person or object, within the
person who attributes
Referral Location The person or thing the content of the
reference is assigned to
Another person or object outside of
the person who attributes
Another person or object within the
person who attributes
Reference Content Theme Paranoid (persecution, harm, hurt,
referential)
Maniacal (grandeur or megalomania)
Passionate (jealousy, infidelity,
Clérambault)







Composition Structure Relational, more or less complex
Non-relational, with one or several
contents
Modality Not perceived with the senses
Involving sensory perception
Both of the above
Indefinite








Differentiation No repetitions or partial or complete
overlapping





Biased by excess and defect
I thought it was like a prize for me (I was in a public square and
I heard church bells),” and then she thought they were recording
all her telephone conversations. On the contrary, the following
example shows overlapping or repeating, and therefore, lack of
differentiation, “Then they’re coming to see me?. (. . .), Are they
coming to see me?” And later, “Tomorrow they’re coming to
see me?” This does not refer to expressions that include formal
TABLE 2 | Attribution framework factors.
Factor groups Factors Cases or values
In the person Emotions, behaviors,
and thoughts






In the setting Family Those in each factor in this group
Work Those in each factor in this group
Leisure and friends Those in each factor in this group
Other Those in each factor in this group
alterations, such as perseveration or palilalia. The third parameter
of quality is fit or how well each attribution corresponds to the
external criteria that evaluate it, its different parts, their sequence,
and the expression as a whole. For example: “I felt really terrible
because a man driving a car insulted me with the letters BCH”
(which for her meant bitch), where formal linguistic expression
is not the problem, but the attribution of the illogical meaning is
based on external parameters. Thus, failure to fit is sometimes due
to lack of or insufficient meaning, as in alogia and in expression
with telegraphic-type speech, such as “Sick help, . . .call father,”
understandable only in certain conversations. Other failures are
from excessive meaning, as in derailing and logorrhea. Other
attributions fail to fit due to absence or excess, such as those that
are tangential and can be qualified as incoherent or illogical.
Attribution Framework Factors
The usefulness of attributions increases when their two-way
relationships with factors that influence them or are modified
by them are considered. That combination of attributions and
their framework factors is described here as a field model. This
type of model, suggested in various branches of physics, health
(Laframboise, 1973; Lalonde, 1974), and psychology (Lewin,
1936; Kantor and Smith, 1975; Ribes, 2018) interprets its subject
matter as an inseparable structure of variables and relationships
that make mutual sense. The model proposed here is the result
of reiterative fitting to a large sample of literature, only partly
referenced due to space limitations.
The many possible framework factors of an attribution are
grouped below (Table 2) by person and setting.
By person, emotions or feelings, behaviors or activities, and
thoughts or ideas are included, either as such, or indirectly
and implicitly in variables such as age, gender, or education.
Another significant factor is personal needs, or a mere threat
to them: physiological, such as breathing, eating, or drinking,
and avoiding pain, and so forth; or psychological, such as
security, affiliation, recognition, and self-realization, as described
by Maslow (1943) and adapted by Self-Determination Theory
(Deci and Ryan, 2000) or by Liotti and Gilbert (2011). Other also
numerous factors in the setting may be classified as family, work,
leisure, and other areas, which could also include the therapist,
when applicable.
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TABLE 3 | Effects of the framework factors.
Effect groups Effects Cases or values



















































Personal needs Reduction or satisfaction
Maintenance
Increase
In setting factors Family Changes or not
Work Changes or not
Leisure, friends Changes or not
Other Changes or not
Effects of Attributions on the Framework
Factors
These relationships refer to changes in the framework factors by
attributions. They may be personal, such as changes in emotions,
behaviors, thoughts, or needs. The resulting emotions may be
grouped by their valence as pleasant, such as joy, pride, or
wellbeing (e.g., “I didn’t want to take the pills because then I
wouldn’t hear the voice of Jesus Christ telling me things that I
liked to hear”), or unpleasant, such as sadness, anxiety, anger,
disgust, perplexity, shame, or guilt, although both could be
present (e.g., “I hate my father, but I love him so much,”), and
an indefinite valence is also possible. The estimated intensity of
the emotion identified is also important.
Resulting behaviors could even be the absence of any at all,
such as in freeze, catatonic inhibition, and classic conversion
paralysis (e.g., “I stopped moving because they made my brain
feel like wood. They were playing with me. And they have
no right!”). Others are attempts to neutralize or reduce the
attribution or its influence (e.g., “I couldn’t say anything, because
then I would really have gone crazy. I didn’t dare think about
anything,”) such as flight and fight behavior (Corr, 2013), or
self-harm or playing very loud music as incompatible elements.
A third type tries to maintain or increase the attribution (e.g.,
“At first, I was scared to death, but then I liked to listen to
them, because they said, ‘You’re such a good person,’ or ‘you
are looking great today!”’). All the behaviors could be either
intentional or involuntary, and even include sleeping, eating,
anesthesia or hypersensitivity without any organic origin, and
sexual appetite. Behaviors should also be considered as help-
seeking or autonomous.
The resulting cognitions are ways individuals have of
understanding their own attributions, or even their absence.
They are self-judgments, not made by an outside analyst like
the rest of the model’s components. There are two groups:
Characterization of the attributions and their quality (see
Table 3). Characterization includes: Origin assigned, in which
the attributions may be understood on their own or imposed
by someone or something (e.g., “Understood, I’ll shut up,” and
the patient clarifies afterward that when the psychologist cleared
his throat during the conversation it was an order to keep quiet
immediately); privacy of the attributions, whether only known to
the one who makes them (e.g., “He’s the one (Jesus Christ) who
only says things to me”), or by someone else, as in diffusion or
thought theft; controllability, or the possibility of the attribution
somehow being interfered with, thoughts being inserted in their
absence (e.g., “It’s the only way,” making a strange repetitive
sound, “It’s how they stop bothering me,” referring to the voices);
and the sense they make of attributions as beneficial, harmful, or
neutral (e.g., “Some bricklayers started to work across the way,
and then I knew that everything was wrong and I had to throw
everything out the window”). The quality or validity they grant
their own attributions is considered with the same criteria as
the precision, differentiation, and fit applicable by the analysist
and summarized in Table 1, but modified to emphasize that they
are the individual’s own opinion. Clarity granted the meaning of
the attribution itself, whether sharp or ambiguous (e.g., “I say
it is something like, as if they grabbed you from behind and
held you back, but I’m not sure if it’s that or what”); distinction
from other attributions they have is whether they are distinct or
overlap with others; and credibility of the attributions themselves,
which could be convincing or question whether they are true,
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FIGURE 2 | Attributions and their framework factors.
whether by outside inference or without it as in saying, “I am
the son of the Count of Peñaflor. . . What a dumb thing I just
said!” Personal needs resulting from the attributions, satisfying
or reducing, maintaining or increasing them, are all possible.
Changes in setting factors, such as the person being treated
differently in the family or work environment after the delusions
or hallucinations, are also possible.
Influence of the Framework Factors on
Attributions
These relationships are changes in the parameters of the
attributions as a result of changes in the person’s framework
factors or setting. Some influence attributions of needs not met,
such as insecurity favoring paranoid themes, lack of recognition
favoring manic themes, affiliation favoring passionate themes,
need for security, somatic themes or self-realization and
affiliation, and depression (Gilbert et al., 2007; Carvalho et al.,
2013). An example of the influence of the setting would be
invalidating environments (Lungu and Linehan, 2017).
Relationships Between Framework
Factors
In the relationships discussed above, attributions affect
framework factors and these in turn influence the attributions,
as shown in Figure 2, with heavy and fine continuous lines,
respectively. In addition, the relationships of the framework
factors should be considered, whether personal, in the setting,
or of one type with the other. When the attributions are not
included, they are considered of secondary importance and are
shown in Figure 2 as dashed lines.
Diachronic Perspective
The synchronic or current perspective of the relationships
described above is matched with a diachronic or longitudinal
perspective. This adds additional information. The unit of
analysis is expanded from an attribution to a set or episode of
attributions, or even a series of episodes, with a conventionally
identified beginning and end. New parameters of the attributions
and framework factors now make sense, mainly: Frequency of
attributions over a certain time and intervals between two in a
row, in addition to trends, such as changes or stability of these
parameters over time. The series of reciprocal relationships formed
by successive influences and effects of framework factors on the
attributions also enter the analysis. This happens, for example,
when the work-climate framework favors an attribution, which
then leads to changes in the person’s behavior and interaction
with the family. This is represented in Figure 2 by the order of
these relationships.
Checklist for Model Application to
Clinical Practice
In addition to conceptualizing hallucinations and delusions, the
model can describe an individual with synchronic and diachronic
analyses of the variables and relationships, which assists in
the assessment, follow-up, and intervention in clinical practice,
testing the ecological validity, and therefore, the usefulness of our
proposal. Two checklists are provided below as a guide, the first
for a cross-sectional description (see Table 4), which is filled in
following the parameters and cases summarized in Tables 1–3, 5.
By applying the checklist above to the successive fields
analyzed in an episode or series of attributions, sets can be
described. A second checklist for this is given below (Table 6).
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
The objective of this study was to integrate hallucinations and
delusions as particular cases of attributions, differentiated by
whether or not sensory perception is involved only when it is
of interest and their expression allows it. The model proposed
synchronically and diachronically delimits the parameters of
any attribution, which makes sense in relation to the person’s
framework factors and settings, enabling significant studies in the
literature to be outlined.
In this approach, the meanings of the attributions that
hallucinations and delusions correspond to, or the way they are
expressed, are low-quality, because they are not precise enough,
are not differentiated enough from each other, nor do they fit to
evaluative criteria, and frequently occur in one or more episodes
or series of episodes, with short intervals between them. The
fewer of those characteristics present in the attributions, the more
likely they are to be merely errors in interpretation. Therefore,
those characteristics enable attribution quality to be graded, from
the most common, which could be considered subthreshold, to
those involving the clinical problems dealt with here.
The rest of the parameters and relationships discussed form
the qualitative type of any attribution. They may be classified by
the location of referents and referral, theme and structure of the
references, language, origin, privacy, controllability, and the sense
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TABLE 4 | Checklist of the synchronic perspective of an attribution.
Person studied:
Date of attribution:
Attribution number or code:
CHARACTERIZATION OF THE ATTRIBUTION:
Who or what is the referent of the attribution?
Who or what is referred to by the attribution?
What type of theme is the reference?
What type of purpose does the reference have?
Does the reference relate to or number the contents?
Does the reference involve sensory perception?
What language is the attribution expressed in?
Does the attribution appear with sufficient precision in form and meaning?
Is the attribution differentiated from other expressions in form and meaning?
Does the attribution fit in form and meaning with the convention considered?
ENUMERATION OF FRAMEWORK FACTORS
What emotions, behaviors, and thoughts of the person appear to be
significant?
What personal needs are detected?
What factors in the setting appear to be significant?
EFFECTS OF THE ATTRIBUTION ON THE FRAMEWORK FACTORS
What emotions are associated with the attribution?
To what degree or intensity do those emotions appear?
What behaviors are considered associated with the attribution?
Do these behaviors help neutralize or maintain the attribution?
Does the person think the attribution is his/her own or someone/something
else’s?
Does the person think the attribution is public or private?
Does the person have control over the attribution?
Does the person give a beneficial or harmful sense to the attribution?
Does the person think the attribution is clear?
Is the attribution differentiated from other thoughts?
What credibility does the person give the attribution?
Does the attribution have any effect on the person’s needs? What and on
which ones?
Does the attribution have any effect on setting factors? What and on which
ones?
INFLUENCES OF FRAMEWORK FACTORS ON THE ATTRIBUTION
Does the attribution modify any framework factors? Which ones and how?
Does the person ask for help or act autonomously?
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN FRAMEWORK FACTORS
Are any relationships between framework factors considered relevant? Why?
TABLE 5 | Influences of framework factors on attributions.
Influences Cases or values
On attributions Modified
Not modified
they make to the person, as well as by their effects and influences
on the framework factors by specifying those involved in each
relationship. This can reveal the formation and development
of the attributions, identifying more framework factors for
clinical attributions and those that modify these framework
factors the most. Thus, due to their mutual relationships with
TABLE 6 | Checklist for a diachronic perspective of the attributional field.
Person studied:
Start and end dates of the series of episodes analyzed:
Number of episodes in the series
Start and end dates of the episodes analyzed:
ATTRIBUTIONS
What parameters change in the attributions considered?
How often do the attributions occur in each episode? And in the whole series?
What is the average frequency of attributions per episode in the series?
What is the average interval between attributions in each episode? And in the
whole series?
Other measures considered of interest:
FRAMEWORK FACTORS
What factors in the person were considered in the episodes?
What personal needs were detected in the episodes?
What factors in the setting could be related to the attribution?
EFFECTS OF THE ATTRIBUTION ON THE FRAMEWORK FACTORS
What effects of the attributions change in each episode in the series? How?
INFLUENCES OF THE FRAMEWORK FACTORS ON THE ATTRIBUTION
What influences of the framework factors on the attributions change in the
episodes? How?
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN FRAMEWORK FACTORS
Have any of the relationships between framework factors changed? How?
OTHER INFORMATION
Any other relevant information?
personal and setting factors found in the literature, attributions
would be accompanied by emotions of a certain intensity,
changes in behavior, and characterizations and credibility
granted by the person.
The various components of the concept of attribution and
framework factors are explained precisely and are sufficiently
differentiated to be understood and used in clinical practice for
assessment and follow-up, and more indirectly, for intervention
in these important manifestations, with the checklists provided
here. We also think that this concept of attribution and of
the framework factor structures is faithful to the most relevant
literature on hallucinations and delusions.
These qualities should be tested by clinicians using the
checklists to detect insufficient precision and thoroughness of
the attribution components and framework factors included.
It would not be surprising that limitations would then appear
that would have to be corrected in the model’s design.
We are aware that the number of components could make
it hard to use in clinical practice. However, that large
number is necessary to reflect as much of the extensive
literature as possible.
In brief, the structure provided by the model proposed
organizes the field of low-quality attributions at the same time
it enables them to be differentiated from others involving less
impairment. This suggests a gradation from phenomena that are
not necessarily pathological, such as self-references, overvalued
ideas, or depersonalization (Reininghaus et al., 2016; Baumeister
et al., 2017; Bell and O’Driscoll, 2018), not discussed here for
reasons of space. This gradation would enable validation of the
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study of low-quality attributions under the conceptual umbrella
of the extended psychotic phenotype (Van Os and Reininghaus,
2016). It would also help adjust the relationship between the
different phenomena under study in determining the onset and
maintenance of the psychotic process.
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